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Introduction 
Insider control is an essential problem in Chinese corporate governance, 
and independent director system was once regarded as a possible cure. 
However, in China, social ties play critical part in many aspects of 
doing business. In the corporate world, while independent directors are 
supposed to be "independent", such a title does not cut their social ties 
with corporate insiders such as CEO, CFO, manager, actual controller 
of firm or the controlling shareholder. These bonds arise out of 
educational background, industrial overlap, shared regional origin, 
military service or even third-party connection, representing informal 
connections that are not captured in conventional measures of 
independence. 
In order to rectify the previous studies' overlook of informal 
connections as a vital parameter, the investigator of this research 
project intends to provide a possible analytical framework to explore 
the potential pattern embedded within the connections between 
independent directors and corporate insiders in the context of corporate 
misconduct. The underlying hypothesis is: Connections between 
independent directors and corporate insiders are not all detrimental; 
nonprofessional bonds formed out of educational and non-business 
experiences would increase the chance of corporate misconducts, whereas 
professional bonds stems from a shared industrial background or 
similar employment history tends to decrease corporate misconducts. 
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I . Failure of Independent Director System in China 
In one official document entitled Opinion on the Establishment of an 
Independent Director System in Listed Companies (hereinafter the 
Opinion) by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (hereinafter 
CSRC), the CSRC specified that by June 2003 independent directors 
should be constituted in the board of directors for at least one-third of 
listed companies in China. The 2005 amendments to the PRC Company 
Law solidified this mandate. The independent director requirement was 
thereafter introduced to Chinese listed companies as a major regulatory 
measure to address the issue that most corporate boards are dominated 
and controlled by controlling-shareholders and insiders. 
Notably, criticism of independent directors in China centers on the 
degree of independence, or more precisely, the degree of lack of 
independence, from the controlling shareholders and other corporate 
insiders. Corporate insiders, as defined in "the Opinion", refer to CEO, 
CFO, manager, actual controller of the firm, controlling shareholder, or 
whoever has the power to affect firm decisions. The Opinion defines 
"independent" as "directors with neither financial nor familial ties to the 
major shareholders and board members". The Opinion also includes a 
list of negative standards which disqualify an individual to be regarded 
as independent. However, absent from the above guidelines, are social 
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connections, which are so firmly embedded into Chinese culture. This, in 
the opinion of the author, largely endangers the core value of the 
independent director system. 
Ex ante regulations adopted by New York Stock Exchange or National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations can hardly 
ensure the impartiality of directors, federal courts in the U.S thus 
exercise an ex post judicial review over the true independence in 
shareholder-derivative suits. In contrast, in China, there is no ex post 
judicial review and derivative suits are rare. Therefore, there is no legal 
mechanism to challenge any improper connections and communications 
between independent directors and corporate insiders. 
China is not alone in the aspect: as most East Asian countries 
subsequently adopted the independent director system from the U.S 
while at the same time are more or less influenced by Chinese culture 
which fosters close relationships between directors and managers, the 
degree of independence of independent directors has become a common 
issue in many Asian countries. 
This has been a controversial issue. Previous studies suggest two 
different effect of social connections. Some argued that such social 
connections may be one ironic cause for information asymmetry (Ma 
and Khanna, 2013), insider-control (Wang, 2008) and single-shareholder 
dominance (Lin et al., 2012), issues of Chinese corporate governance that 
the independent director system was introduced to mitigate in the first 
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place. On the other hand, however, others argued that independent 
directors with social ties to management are better informed and can 
thereby advise and monitor the operation of the company with more 
efficiency (Tan et al., 2010; Faleye et al., 2011). 
The dual effect of different forms of social connections is crucial. 
Social ties among independent directors and corporate insiders are 
unavoidable. An objective study on these connections is crucial to re-
evaluate the independent director system in China, and thereby provides 
insight to avoid the "transplant effect" which refers to the 
ineffectiveness of legal transplantation from the origin country (Shi, 
2010). 
This research intends to bring up a possible economic analytical 
framework for future research by providing insights into the the 
following questions: First, what are the potential patterns of social 
connections between independent directors and corporate insiders in 
China? What are the separate impact of those connections on corporate 
misconduct? Second, do social connections between independent directors 
and corporate insiders encourage company misconduct? If yes, to what 
extent? Last but not the least, how should policy makers comprehend 
social connections between independent directors and corporate insiders? 
What kind of legal reform is necessary to address such ties? 
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I . Types of Connections between Independent Directors 
and Corporate Insiders 
The dual effect brought by different forms of social connections on 
corporate misconduct is the core of the proposed research. The impact 
of networking on corporate behaviors has been studied by a number of 
scholars. Social network researchers suggested that any one type of 
network could have positive or negative effects (Mullainathan et al., 
1998; Wallman, 2005). Robert and Abbie (2003) argued that whether 
personal connectedness promote or harm financial report quality 
depends on information cost of firms (see also Lambert et al., 2006; 
Omer et al., 2015). Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) reported that 
common educational background between board directors facilitate 
management efficiency. Schmidt (2009) studied the bad influence of 
connectedness between CEO and directors in mergers and acquisitions 
employing social ties as a RHS variable (See also Cai and Sevilir, 2009; 
Ishii and Xuan, 2009). Some evidence in these findings were carefully 
examined in order to generate points for this debate. 
There is burgeoning literature exploring the legal implications of social 
networks between executives and independent directors in China. Wang 
and Xiao, (2005) concluded that CEO-director ties are pernicious to firm 
performance (See also Luo and Tang, 2007). Li (2010) found that social 
connections between a director and CEO create a risk of corruption in 
Chinese SOEs (see also Ko and Weng 2011). Ye and Zhang (2011) 
reviewed CEO-director connectedness and independent directors'voting 
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behavior. Chen and Xie (2012) discussed independent director social 
relations and CEO remuneration. More recently, Chen, Wang and Lin 
(2014) analyzed independent directors'board networks and controlling 
shareholders'tunneling behavior; Zhu et al. (2015) explored the board 
hierarchy in China and its relation to firm value. These papers on 
social networks tend to focus on network centrality such as degree 
centrality, closeness centrality and eigenvector centrality. Stil, there is 
no clear and conclusive description of what the social connections are. 
Almost al those studies focused on a general term referred to as 
guanxi, which means social ties or personal connections in Chinese. This 
proposed research will add to the current debate not only by 
reassessing the role of independent directors in corporate misconduct, 
but also by identifying different forms of guanxi that existed in 
Chinese business practice and by providing empirical evidence on how 
those social connections shape the Chinese corporate governance 
environment. 
Grosman and Wright (2015) suggested that shared characteristics and 
experiences ease communication and facilitate mutual understanding, 
thereby fostering personal connections (See also Westphal and Milton 
(2000), Zhang et al. (2014); Ni (2015). This research will begin with 
operationalizing informal ties between independent directors and 
d corporate ms1ders through shared qualities an experiences. 
Preious empirical studies with regression analysis have inspired the 
proposed research. Chidambaran, Kedia and Prabhala (2011) examined 
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the separate impact of professional and nonprofessional CEO-director 
connectedness on financial fraud. Data set of this research is a modified 
version of the sample constructed by CKP updated to December 2014 
and applied to China. Hwang and Kim (2009) associate connections 
arising from military experience, regional origin and third-party 
connection with greater tunneling behaviors by controlling 
shareholders. Their classification of social ties is illuminating and 
suitable for analyzing the way social ties are formed in China. 
Following the method of Chidambaran, Kedia and Prabhala (2011), the 
author classifies social connections between independent directors and 
corporate insiders as professional and nonprofessional. 
Professional connections arise out of academic discipline and industry 
overlap. Westphal (1999) and He et al. (2009) pointed out that 
professional advising and counseling is more likely when CEOs and 
directors come from the same industry or share similar academic way 
of thinking. Adams and Ferreira (2003) further documented that having 
similar prior employment history with a CEO can help independent 
directors better judge a CEO's actions and therefore leads to better 
monitoring. From both perspectives, the beneficial effect of professional 
connections are consistent with the "collaborative board view" in 
behavior research, which suggests professional ties facilitate greater 
professional interactions and closer advisory relationships, leading 
management executives to avert opportunistic behavior (Wong and 
Simon, 2011; Hsu and Wu, 2013). 
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The second category are the nonprofessional connections. Following the 
method of Hwang and Kim (2012), the following measures are taken 
into consideration: alma mater, military service, regional origin and 
third party connection. Same educational background and military 
service enhance interaction via shared traditions and sense of group 
identity (Crosse et al., 2004; Huang and Pan, 2010). Regional clustering 
of dialects, culture and lifestyle contributes to an affinity for others 
from the same locale (Greenberg et al., 2011). A mutual third-party 
connection strengthens bonds and facilitates relationship building 
(Granovetter, 2005). While these types of informal bonds can positively 
improve teamwork, they can also undermine the independent directors' 
oversight function (Gao et al., 2006; Tung, 2011). Which of the two 
effects dominates is ultimately an empirical issue that will be 
determined by data analysis. 
The anticipated result is: in China, professional connections would 
reduce corporate misconduct probability, while nonprofessional 
connections would increase the likelihood. The author would go deeper 
into analyzing and making conclusions regarding to this hypothesis 
based on the data. 
il. Logit and Probit Model 
In order to identify different types of social connections and examine 
varying degrees of influence of these bonds in the operations of 
companies, economic analysis is critical. Through a regression equation 
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between social connections and corporate misconduct in a logit model, 
the degree of responsibility to the occurrence of corporate misconduct is 
revealed. 
'Logit and probit'model is widely used in sociology, economics and 
strategic management research for dichotomous or binary outcome 
variables. Since the goal of this research is to address the legal issues 
in Chinese corporate governance through investigating what effect of 
independent directors -corporate insiders'social connections has on 
corporate misconduct, an outcome that is binary in nature (misconduct 
either happens or not happen), a logit model would be a suitable 
method for the intended study. The vectors of social connections 
between independent directors and corporate insiders should be 
identified beforehand to run the regression. 
A. Data 
Primary data source of this research on independent directors and the 
corporate insiders (including CEO, CFO, managers, actual controller of 
firm and controlling shareholder) will be collected from the TDX 
database and TOPVIEW database. Corporate misconduct data will be 
collected from the CSRC official website, CSRC internal disclosure and 
CNINFO database. Firm financial performance data, accounting data 
will be collected from CSMAR database. This study contains 629 A-
share Chinese listed companies from January 2005 to December 2014, 
392 of which violated regulatory rules or received warnings from CSRC 
or CSRC dispatched offices. 
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Data on sample firm's independent directors'and core corporate insiders' 
academic discipline, employment history, alma mater, military service 
and regional origin will be hand-collected from the TDX database and 
other relevant public sources. To determine each subject's discipline, 
education background and regional origin, resumes provided by TDX 
database will be explored. For those whose files are blank, a cross-
search of their backgrounds from CSMAR and TOPVIEW database will 
be conducted. Afterwards, industry ties can be defined using the Fama 
and French (1997) 49-industry classification. The data would be cleaned 
and coded for each individual and aggregated at firm level for each 
fiscal year. Social connections will be probed and categorized by the 
roles played by every subject when the bonds were formed. 
Furthermore, to make the investigation thorough and precise, 
additional information will be collected from Enterprise Yellow Page 
China, proxy disclosures, Chinese SOE Index and other relevant 
databases, if necessary. 
B. Regression Variables 
1 . Dependent Variable 
In analyzing how different socials ties may lead to corporate 
misconduct, the degree of propensity to corporate misconduct is set to 
be the dependent variable, while different social ties is set to be the 
explanatory variables. 
The research will use a binary variable to proxy corporate misconduct. 
Misconduct behaviors including: involvement in related party 
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transactions, misuse of company funds by controlling shareholders, 
tunneling behaviors, financial reporting fraud, market manipulating 
behavior (which are the five most common type in CSRC 
announcements) and other wrongdoings that against CSRC regulation 
or Chinese Security Law. The dependent variable equals 1 ifthe firm 
engages in corporate misconduct in the fiscal year and O otherwise. 
2. Professional Connections and Nonprofessional Connections 
Independent directors are classified as having professional connections 
with corporate insiders if they come from the same academic discipline 
or shared working experience in the same industry. Independent 
directors are classified as having nonprofessional connections with 
corporate insiders if they attended the same university, served in the 
army, come from the same locale or share a social tie with a common 
third-party. 
Those connections will be graded further in the multivariate analysis by 
the nature of those ties and by the type of the firm at which the bonds 
were formed. These univariate differences will be examined using a logit 
specification that controls for al explanatory variables simultaneously. 
3 . Other Control Variables 
Motivated by prior research, the following control variables should be 
added to account for various economic and governance factors that 
affect firm's propensity to misconduct. Those variables will be included 
in al the logit specifications to follow. 
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First, variables regarding firm characteristics are important. The firm 
size would be controlled using a log of total assets. Profitable firms are 
reluctant to cross legal lines (Uzzi, 1996; Jiang and Yue, 2005). 
(1) 
Profitability would be controlled by including the ratio of EBITDA to 
total assets. Moreover, high-growth companies have the incentive to 
engage in fraud when facing reduced growth opportunities (Pavel et al., 
2007; Tang et al., 2005), and growth opportunities would be controlled 
by including Tobin's Q, following Davis, Fama and French (2000). 
Second, variables regarding board and independent director 
characteristics should not be ignored. Board size and the ratio of 
independent directors are positively related to corporate misgovernance 
(Soliman and Ragab, 2013). Independent director with multiple 
independent directorships tend to do their job better since they care 
more about their reputation (Yermack, 2003). The number of other 
independent directorships held by each independent director of the firm 
will be counted and then be averaged across al directors. As observed 
by many Chinese scholars, hiring scholar, retired government official or 
accountant as independent directors lead to different governmental 
climate of a firm (Li et al., 2004; Xiao et al., 2009). Three different 
dummy variables are created to testify this view point respectively. 
Moreover, Chinese scholars also found that, when chairman of the 
board and CEO of the firm is the same person in Chinese listed 
companies, the CEO is more likely to misuse his power, thereby lead to 
more corporate malfeasance in practice (Yu and Xia, 2004; Wang, 2007; 
Ju and Pan, 2010). A dummy variable will be tested to proxy this 
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situation in China. 
C. Logit Model 
1. Overview 
In order to test different types of social ties and their effect on 
corporate misconduct, Binary Logistic Regression Method is 
appropriate. Vectors of connections between independent directors 
(hereinafter ID) and corporate insiders (hereinafter CI) in the logit 
model are listed below. Coefficient of each variable would be interpreted 
to determine whether it will increase or will decrease the likelihood of 
corporate misconduct. Then, different effects of the variables will be 
entangled subsequently in the multivariate logit specification in section 
3.3.3. Vectors of director and board characteristics will also be included 
in additional tests. These vectors not only serve as a robustness tests 
but are also as an independent test to deliver a more precise picture in 
Chinese corporate governance. 
2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Name Description 
Depend叫 :Var紐hie
MISCON Equals 1 ifthe firm engages in corporate misconduct in the fiscal year and 0 
otherwise 
Prnfossfoua! Cmmectio皿＊
ACA_SCALE Number of IDs who shares/shared same academic discipline with the CI 
DST_SCALE Number of IDs who shares/shared industry overlap with the CI 
Ncmprofessimial Co皿 cdi呻＊
EDU_SCALE Number of IDs who graduated from the same university with the CI 
MIL_SCALE Number of IDs who also served in the army as the CI 
LOC_SCALE Number of IDs who comes from the same locale as the CI 
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THI_SCALE Number of IDs who shares/shared a social tie with a common third-party with 
the CI 
fodepell(font Director aぽ斎dCorporate 夏nsiderCh:inictcdstics 
BOA_SIZE Number of directors of the board 
IND_FRA Percentage of IDs on the board 
DIR_NUM Average number of Independent Directorship held by IDs 
SCHOLAR Dummy Variable: equals 1 ifthe board has a scholar as ID and O otherwise 
OFFICAL Dummy Variable: equals 1 ifthe board has a retired government official as ID 
and O otherwise 
ACCOUNT Dummy Variable: equals 1 ifthe board has an accountant or financial expert as 
ID and O otherwise 
CHA_CEO D皿皿yVariable: equals 1 ifchairman of the board and CEO of the frrm is the 
same person and O otherwise 
Fkm Charnd~risdぐS
FIR_SIZE Log of book value of assets of the f11Il 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation scaled by total assets 
TOBINQ Market value to book value 
* All variables of social ties are scaled by the number of directors in the firm's board. 
3 . Regression Equations 
Baseline Model for Corporate Misconduct 
MISCON* =Po+邸 BOA_SJZE)+邸IND_FRA)+邸DIR_NUM)+位(SCHOLAR)
+ P5(0FFICAL) + P6(ACCOUNT) + P7(CHA_CEO) + Pa(FIR_SIZE) 
+ P9(EBITDA) + P10(TOBINQ) 
Corporate Misconduct and ID-CI Professional Connections 
MISCON* = p。＋邸BOA_SIZE)+邸IND_FRA)+邸DJR_NUM)+佐(SCHOLAR)
+ P5(0FFICAL) + P6(ACCOUNT) + P7(CHA_CEO) + Pa(FIR_SIZE) 
+ P9(EBITDA) + p10(TOBINQ) + /?1 (ACA_SCALE) + {J立(DST_SCALE)
Corporate Misconduct and ID-CI Nonprofessional Connections 
MISCON* =約＋邸BOA_SIZE)+邸IND_FRA)+邸DIR_NUM)+邸SCHOLAR)
+ P5(0FFICAL) + P6(ACCOUNT) + P7(CHA_CEO) + P8(FIR_SIZE) 
+ P9(EBITDA) + P10(TOBINQ) +恥(EDU. .SCALE) +恥(M!l,_SCALE)
+ {J13(LOC_SCALB) + f114(TH!_SCALH) 
Robustness Tests on ID-CI professional Connections and ID Characteristics 
MISCON* = p。+P1 (ACA_SCALE) +邸DST_SCALE)+ p3(DIR_NUM) + P4(SCHOLAR) 
+ P5(0FFICAL) + P6(ACCOUNT) + P7(CHA_CEO) 
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